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Partying Like It’s 1929 Paul Krugman, NYTimes, 21. März
2008 If Ben Bernanke manages to
save the financial system from collapse, he will — rightly — be praised for his heroic efforts. But what we should be asking
is: How did we get here? Why does the financial
system need salvation? Why do mild-mannered
economists have to become superheroes? The answer, at a fundamental
level, is that we’re paying the price for willful amnesia. We chose to forget
what happened in the 1930s — and having refused to learn from history, we’re
repeating it. Contrary to popular belief,
the stock market crash of 1929 wasn’t the defining moment of the Great
Depression. What turned an ordinary recession into a civilization-threatening
slump was the wave of bank runs that swept across This banking crisis of the
1930s showed that unregulated, unsupervised financial markets can all too
easily suffer catastrophic failure. As the decades passed,
however, that lesson was forgotten — and now we’re relearning it, the hard
way. To grasp the problem, you
need to understand what banks do. Banks exist because they
help reconcile the conflicting desires of savers and borrowers. Savers want
freedom — access to their money on short notice. Borrowers want commitment:
they don’t want to risk facing sudden demands for repayment. Normally, banks satisfy both
desires: depositors have access to their funds whenever they want, yet most
of the money placed in a bank’s care is used to make long-term loans. The
reason this works is that withdrawals are usually more or less matched by new
deposits, so that a bank only needs a modest cash reserve to make good on its
promises. But sometimes — often based
on nothing more than a rumor — banks face runs, in which many people try to
withdraw their money at the same time. And a bank that faces a run by
depositors, lacking the cash to meet their demands, may go bust even if the
rumor was false. Worse yet, bank runs can be
contagious. If depositors at one bank lose their money, depositors at other
banks are likely to get nervous, too, setting off a chain reaction. And there
can be wider economic effects: as the surviving banks try to raise cash by
calling in loans, there can be a vicious circle in which bank runs cause a
credit crunch, which leads to more business failures, which leads to more
financial troubles at banks, and so on. That, in brief, is what
happened in 1930-1931, making the Great Depression the disaster it was. So
Congress tried to make sure it would never happen again by creating a system
of regulations and guarantees that provided a safety net for the financial
system. And we all lived happily for
a while — but not for ever after. Wall Street chafed at
regulations that limited risk, but also limited potential profits. And little
by little it wriggled free — partly by persuading politicians to relax the
rules, but mainly by creating a “shadow banking system” that relied on
complex financial arrangements to bypass regulations designed to ensure that
banking was safe. For example, in the old
system, savers had federally insured deposits in tightly regulated savings
banks, and banks used that money to make home loans. Over time, however, this
was partly replaced by a system in which savers put their money in funds that
bought asset-backed commercial paper from special investment vehicles that
bought collateralized debt obligations created from securitized mortgages —
with nary a regulator in sight. As the years went by, the
shadow banking system took over more and more of the banking business,
because the unregulated players in this system seemed to offer better deals
than conventional banks. Meanwhile, those who worried about the fact that
this brave new world of finance lacked a safety net were dismissed as
hopelessly old-fashioned. In fact, however, we were
partying like it was 1929 — and now it’s 1930. The financial crisis
currently under way is basically an updated version of the wave of bank runs
that swept the nation three generations ago. People aren’t pulling cash out
of banks to put it in their mattresses — but they’re doing the modern
equivalent, pulling their money out of the shadow banking system and putting
it into Treasury bills. And the result, now as then, is a vicious circle of
financial contraction. Mr. Bernanke and his
colleagues at the Fed are doing all they can to end that vicious circle. We
can only hope that they succeed. Otherwise, the next few years will be very
unpleasant — not another Great Depression, hopefully, but surely the worst
slump we’ve seen in decades. Even if Mr. Bernanke pulls
it off, however, this is no way to run an economy. It’s time to relearn the
lessons of the 1930s, and get the financial system back under control. |